Investment Law: The\u00a0Fine\u00a0Print<\/b><\/p>
Mexico\u2019s new infrastructure investment law went into effect on April 9. The regulation creates a legal framework for mixed investment in strategic infrastructure \u2014 spanning energy, transport, water, health, education,\u00a0tourism\u00a0and urban development \u2014 through contracts open to domestic or foreign firms, with a duration of up to 40 years. It also formalises a new category of\u00a0Strategic Investment Contracts<\/b>, which define the relationship between private developers and government entities and are designed to support long-term project financing and execution.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>
The legislation\u2019s fiscal design is carefully constructed. The law does not, by itself, authorise public spending or borrowing; projects\u00a0remain\u00a0subject to the Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law, must register and\u00a0monitor\u00a0multi-year commitments, and may access support such as financing, guarantees or tax incentives only with the relevant legal approvals.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>
It also allows complex financing structures \u2014 including the use of\u00a0special purpose vehicles and capital markets instruments such as CKDs, CERPIs and Fibra E\u00a0\u2014 without automatically classifying them as public debt, while preserving a stepped dispute-resolution scheme: alternative mechanisms first, arbitration if necessary, and federal courts at the end of the chain.\u00a0 The goal is to provide private investors with certainty, without surrendering public control. As President Sheinbaum herself said at the April 12 inauguration of the first of 15 planned national Economic Development Hubs in\u00a0Huamantla, Tlaxcala: \u201cThe State cannot do everything.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>
The new law sparked\u00a0an initial\u00a0flare-up of controversy, based on the fake claim that the government could start tapping workers\u2019 pension savings to fund strategic public projects.\u00a0Amafore\u00a0moved quickly to\u00a0contain\u00a0the alarm, stressing that the legislation does not authorise the discretionary use of retirement savings and does not compel\u00a0Afores\u00a0to divert a fixed share of their portfolios into public works. Nothing has\u00a0actually\u00a0changed.\u00a0<\/p>
Amafore\u2019s\u00a0clarification included a reminder that the 30% investment ceiling is not new; it has existed within the regulatory framework since\u00a0Consar\u00a0updated regulation in October 2024 to allow\u00a0Siefores\u00a0for younger\u00a0workers\u00a0to invest up to that level in structured instruments. The new law neither changes that cap, nor does it make it mandatory.\u00a0Amafore\u00a0also reiterated that each\u00a0Afore\u2019s\u00a0investment committee must evaluate projects independently and professionally, and that infrastructure investments will\u00a0proceed\u00a0only when projects are profitable,\u00a0well-structured\u00a0and able to clear the sector\u2019s technical and risk filters. This aligns with the law\u2019s broader intent to\u00a0channel private,\u00a0public\u00a0and even social capital into\u00a0viable\u00a0projects under a disciplined institutional framework<\/b>.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>
Afores\u00a0currently\u00a0allocate\u00a0only around 8% to 9% of managed assets for infrastructure through vehicles such as CKDs and CERPIs \u2014 well below the regulatory ceiling. Industry estimates suggest that, in time, allocations could rise toward 25%, potentially mobilising between MXN 1.2 trillion and MXN 1.5 trillion for productive infrastructure, particularly as the pipeline of eligible projects expands under the new framework and gains institutional backing.\u00a0<\/p>
One of the less discussed but more consequential features of the new infrastructure law is that each year\u2019s draft budget must include a specific section, broken down by sector, showing the multi-year spending commitments tied to strategic investments signed in previous years. That means listing each contract, how much has already been spent, how far execution has advanced, the timetable, and the annual or deferred payments still committed for the year ahead.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>
Lawmakers argue that this should make liabilities,\u00a0risks\u00a0and contingencies more transparent, while giving strategic projects stronger budget protection over time \u2014 particularly given that the law also introduces\u00a0preferential treatment for infrastructure commitments in future budget planning.\u00a0\u00a0The practical aim is\u00a0fairly clear: to improve the chances that major works are\u00a0actually completed, and to reduce the familiar risk of public money being scattered across projects that are announced with enthusiasm and then quietly left behind.<\/p>
The law stipulates 180 days to issue secondary regulations, another 180 days for the Finance Ministry\u2019s guidelines, and 120 days to install the Strategic Planning Council. Projects launched in 2026 may still be submitted to the Council to qualify for Strategic Investment Vehicles, while older ones may migrate into Mixed Participation Schemes with prior approval. In practice, this adds a layer of institutional filtering before the new model is fully operational, with the Council playing a central role in prioritising projects, determining eligibility and structuring public-private participation across sectors.<\/p>
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Pension Reform Meets the Problem of Retroactivity<\/b><\/p>
Mexico\u2019s new pension reform, which went into effect on April 11, is being presented politically as a strike against so-called \u201cgolden pensions\u201d. Legally, however, the more consequential issue is structural, not symbolic. The amendment to Article 127 establishes a new ceiling: pensions and retirement benefits for trust-level personnel in decentralised agencies, state-owned enterprises, national credit institutions and public trusts must not exceed 50% of the remuneration of the president. Crucially, the decree does not limit itself to future cases, ordering current pensions granted under earlier schemes be adjusted to the new cap, while giving institutions 90 days to modify contracts and general working conditions.<\/p>
The legal vulnerability is clear. Article 14 of the Constitution states that no law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, and critics are already organising their argument around that principle. Columnist Sergio Sarmiento has been among the more vocal in pressing the point, arguing that whatever one\u2019s opinion of unusually generous retirement packages, applying a new cap to benefits previously granted is constitutionally suspect. His warning is that this can have broader scope beyond pension politics: once the state normalises retroactive enforcement to reduce legally valid pensions, the damage is not limited to retirees but extends to legal certainty itself.<\/p>
This debate\u00a0is likely to move quickly from public\u00a0controversy\u00a0to technical litigation. The state will argue\u00a0for\u00a0fiscal discipline and equity, especially given the reform\u2019s exemptions for the armed forces, voluntary individual savings, union-funded complementary schemes and previously granted judicial retirement benefits under the prior framework. Plaintiffs, meanwhile, will focus less on fairness in the abstract and more on\u00a0acquired\u00a0rights, legitimate\u00a0expectations\u00a0and the specific legal architecture under which each pension was earned.<\/p>
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Modernizing IP Law; Nudging Towards AI Regulation<\/b><\/p>
Mexico\u00a0is moving\u00a0forward\u00a0in its\u00a0intellectual property modernization effort, with the copyright reform reaching a resolution in the Chamber of Deputies\u00a0last week.\u00a0<\/p>
On the patents and trademarks side, President Claudia Sheinbaum signed a decree overhauling more than 200 articles of the Federal Law for the Protection of Industrial Property, published in the Official Gazette\u00a0on April 3. The reform introduces legally binding response deadlines for the first time\u00a0(one year for patents and industrial designs, five months for trademarks with no objections)\u00a0and creates an internal oversight committee empowered to compel officials to resolve stalled applications within ten business days, under threat of disciplinary action. The law also introduces a provisional patent application mechanism, extends sanctions for intellectual property violations to conduct carried out through AI, and prohibits the registration of trademarks incorporating indigenous or Afro-Mexican cultural heritage without explicit community consent.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>
The Federal Copyright Law reform, which had stalled amid accusations from coalition partner the\u00a0Labour\u00a0Party (PT) that lobbyists were gutting its protections for artists, has now been approved by the Chamber of Deputies with 368 votes in\u00a0favour. The\u00a0final version\u00a0\u2014 which also amends the Federal Labor Law \u2014 addresses the central concern of the debate: protecting performers,\u00a0voice\u00a0actors, and other artists from having their voices and likenesses replicated without consent by AI systems. Key provisions require written prior agreement before any AI-based transformation or substitution of a performer\u2019s voice or image, replace a blanket prohibition on AI imitation with a regulatory framework requiring explicit consent and negotiated compensation, and extend the scope of copyright infringements to close legal loopholes. A last-minute amendment\u00a0also corrected what critics had flagged as a \u201cretroactivity trap\u201d in royalty payment language that could have allowed companies to invoke decades-old contracts to avoid compensating artists.\u00a0<\/p>
The opposition PAN and PRI abstained, with the PRI calling the law \u201cambiguous and poorly designed,\u201d and PAN noting the irony of legislating on AI without first granting Congress explicit constitutional authority to do\u00a0so;\u00a0a step that Morena\u2019s\u00a0leader in the lower house,\u00a0Ricardo Monreal,\u00a0acknowledged would still need to happen.<\/p>
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Changes\u00a0at\u00a0SAT Likely to be Welcomed<\/b><\/p>
The SAT has appointed Jennifer Krystel Castillo Madrid as head of its Large Taxpayers Administration (AGGC), effective May 1, replacing Armando Ram\u00edrez S\u00e1nchez, who will remain within the agency in another capacity. The move places a seasoned legal and public-sector operator \u2014 with more than 18 years of experience across Mexico City\u2019s finance apparatus and most recently the Energy Ministry \u2014 in one of the most sensitive areas of tax enforcement,\u00a0directly responsible\u00a0for overseeing compliance among the country\u2019s largest corporate contributors.\u00a0<\/p>
Castillo\u2019s profile is distinctly technocratic. A law graduate from ITAM with postgraduate specialization in administrative and regulatory law, and\u00a0additional\u00a0executive training at IPADE, she has built her career inside the financial and legal machinery of government. Her trajectory \u2014 from the Mexico City Finance Secretariat to a senior legal role under Luz Elena Gonz\u00e1lez at the Energy Ministry \u2014 underscores her integration into a tight-knit policy\u00a0group\u00a0that\u00a0has steadily expanded its influence within the federal administration.\u00a0<\/p>
The appointment points to a continued consolidation of power by the Sheinbaum-aligned technocratic wing of Morena, particularly in areas tied to fiscal oversight and economic management. Luz Elena Gonz\u00e1lez, widely seen as one of President Sheinbaum\u2019s closest and most trusted collaborators on financial matters, has increasingly placed members of her team in strategic positions beyond the energy sector, suggesting a broader institutional footprint.\u00a0And Edgar Amador, the\u00a0Finance Minister, is\u00a0broadly\u00a0from the same wing, even if not thought\u00a0to\u00a0be as close to the President as Luz Elena,\u00a0reflected in\u00a0his wilderness years\u00a0out of\u00a0the\u00a0CDMX government\u00a0while Sheinbaum was Mayor.\u00a0<\/p>
At the same time, the move carries clear internal political implications. Control of the Large Taxpayers Administration is central to the government\u2019s revenue strategy, given its focus on maximizing collections from major corporations and high-value taxpayers. Placing a trusted technocrat in this role reinforces a more disciplined, legalistic approach to enforcement and policy execution.\u00a0<\/p>
By implication, the appointment may also be read as a relative weakening of the more political AMLO-aligned networks within the fiscal apparatus.\u00a0In particular, Antonio\u00a0Mart\u00ednez Dagnino, the current head of the SAT and widely reported to be close to Andy L\u00f3pez Beltr\u00e1n,\u00a0and by extension the\u00a0broader\u00a0Lopez Obrador group,\u00a0could see this as an encroachment by an external power\u00a0center. The arrival of a senior figure tied to Luz Elena Gonz\u00e1lez into such a critical operational role is unlikely to go unnoticed within the\u00a0institution, and\u00a0may subtly reshape internal balances of influence within the SAT going forward.\u00a0Might Castillo be a future head of the SAT?<\/p>
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Pharma Investigations Make Distressing Reading<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>
A big investigation\u00a0report by\u00a0EL PA\u00cdS<\/b><\/a>,\u00a0Univision,\u00a0<\/b>Quinto\u00a0Elemento\u00a0Lab<\/b><\/a>\u00a0and the ICIJ<\/b>\u00a0underlines\u00a0the counterfeit problem in Mexico\u2019s pharmaceutical market, and will not make\u00a0easy reading, given its deeply distressing implications. What\u00a0emerges\u00a0is not a story of isolated criminality at the margins, but of a broader failure of public procurement, regulatory\u00a0enforcement\u00a0and supply-chain control, in which fake and suspect medicines\u00a0appear to have\u00a0penetrated parts of the public health system itself.\u00a0<\/p> The central claim is stark: Mexico now has a criminal ecosystem dedicated to importing,\u00a0manufacturing\u00a0and distributing counterfeit medicines, and the problem has worsened sharply since 2018. According to the reporting, complaints over allegedly falsified medicines rose from 45 in 2018 to more than 250 a year from 2022 onward. Official health alerts followed a similar trajectory, increasing from just two in 2018 to more than 30 annually from 2022. The investigation links that rise, at least in part, to the disorder created by repeated changes in public-sector purchasing systems and the broader medicine shortages that followed.\u00a0<\/p> The most disturbing element is that this is not simply a black-market story. The investigation alleges that falsified medicines have reached public hospitals, including\u00a0highly sensitive\u00a0oncology treatments. Keytruda, Merck\u2019s blockbuster cancer drug, sits at the centre of the reporting. In Mexico, a legal vial\u00a0reportedly costs\u00a0around MXN100,000, while counterfeit or suspect versions can be found for a fraction of that price in illegal markets. The gap is more than a pricing anomaly; it is an invitation to criminal arbitrage in a system under supply stress.\u00a0<\/p> The reporting describes patients receiving suspect or falsified oncology medicines inside public institutions, adverse reactions, and later confirmation that certain lots had been flagged in sanitary alerts. It also points to a wider procurement problem: distributors accused or flagged for counterfeit medicines continued to win public contracts. According to the investigation, dozens of irregular suppliers sold billions of pesos of medicines to public institutions between 2021 and 2025. That is the sort of allegation that lands with force because it suggests not only criminal penetration, but institutional tolerance, weak\u00a0controls\u00a0or both.\u00a0<\/p> There is also a broader structural point here. High-cost medicines with chronic shortages are especially vulnerable to falsification. The reporting\u00a0identifies\u00a0three conditions that repeatedly appear in counterfeit cases: drugs without marketing authorisation in Mexico, medicines in short supply, and high-priced treatments. In practical terms, that makes expensive cancer therapies\u00a0almost a\u00a0perfect target. Small, high-value units are easier to move, easier to disguise and potentially attractive for illicit finance as well.\u00a0<\/p> The Guadalajara neighbourhood of\u00a0El Santuario<\/b> is presented as the clearest symbol of the problem: an open market for stolen, adulterated and falsified medicines, operating with apparent visibility and limited deterrence. The report also cites US concerns about weak enforcement, including a lack of visible investigations and limited prosecutorial activity in related intellectual-property and counterfeiting cases.<\/p> The political and policy implications are severe. This is not just about piracy or commercial fraud. It is about patient safety, state\u00a0capacity\u00a0and trust in public healthcare. If genuine shortages, fragmented\u00a0procurement\u00a0and weak enforcement are together creating a channel for falsified medicines to enter the system, then the issue is no longer peripheral. It is becoming a test of whether the Mexican state can guarantee that medicines bought with public money are both available and real.<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> A CURP for Every Line, and Liability for Every Lapse<\/b><\/p> Mexico\u2019s Supreme Court has now drawn a clearer line around telecom liability in the age of digital fraud. In two decisions arising from the same case, the Court ruled that a mobile operator incurred subjective extracontractual civil liability after negligently issuing a replacement SIM card to a third party, enabling a classic SIM-swapping fraud. The consequences were not merely technical. Once control of the number was lost, the victim suffered attempted fraudulent banking transactions, unauthorised access to digital accounts and the dissemination of private images. The Court\u2019s argument was straightforward: when a mobile number functions as the gateway to a person\u2019s financial, personal and private life, a careless SIM replacement is not an administrative mishap. It is a serious legal failure.<\/p> What makes the ruling significant is the standard of care it imposes. The company admitted the SIM had been replaced but could not prove a robust verification process. It offered little more than an employee email saying an ID had been requested, without showing what document was presented, what data had been checked, or whether there were signatures, photos or any other verifiable record of the transaction. For the Court, that was not merely weak procedure; it was negligence in a context where the risks are well known. Telecoms operators, it said, are not just technical service providers but guarantors of personal data, confidential communications and line security.<\/p> The ruling arrives just as Mexico is tightening\u00a0identity\u00a0controls\u00a0for mobile\u00a0phone\u00a0lines: users now have until\u00a0June 30\u00a0to register their phone numbers and link them to their\u00a0CURP or\u00a0face the definitive suspension of voice and data service. The stated\u00a0objective\u00a0is to reduce anonymity in crimes such as fraud and extortion, and the process\u00a0can\u00a0be completed online or through customer service centres. This\u00a0makes the Court\u2019s decision even more consequential:\u00a0if the state is asking citizens to tie a mobile line more firmly to their legal identity, telecoms operators will find it\u00a0even\u00a0harder to argue that a negligent SIM replacement is a minor procedural lapse,\u00a0rather than a failure with potentially severe consequences.<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> Choosing Referees Under Procedural Pressure<\/b><\/p> Mexico\u2019s process for appointing three new members of the INE\u2019s General Council is beginning to look less like a routine constitutional replacement exercise and more like a test. How much procedural compression can a credibility-sensitive institution absorb before confidence starts to fray? OPINE\u2019s demand for full disclosure of applicants\u2019 public CVs, statements of intent and essays is therefore not a trivial transparency plea; it goes to the legal integrity of a process that must produce a fully integrated Council in time for the opening of the 2027 electoral period.<\/p> The concern is compounded by two\u00a0additional\u00a0pressures: timing and suspicion. OPINE has already warned that the late issuance of the call and the\u00a0accelerated timeline limit\u00a0serious scrutiny of each candidate\u2019s independence,\u00a0experience\u00a0and prior conduct. Meanwhile,\u00a0Kenia\u00a0L\u00f3pez\u00a0Rabad\u00e1n,\u00a0chairwoman\u00a0of\u00a0the House of Deputies,\u00a0has publicly raised concern over reports of a\u00a0possible leak\u00a0of the\u00a0applicant\u00a0examination, stressing that such a failure should not occur in a process central to democratic\u00a0integrity.<\/p> Analysts have noticed that several of the best-scoring applicants are close to the ruling party \u2014 including figures linked to Sheinbaum\u2019s orbit and to Taddei\u2019s own team \u2014 inevitably bringing up questions about impartiality.<\/p> Among the highest-rated candidates are Arturo Manuel Ch\u00e1vez L\u00f3pez and Bernardo Valle Monroy, both of whom scored 99 points. Ch\u00e1vez currently serves as head of Talleres\u00a0Gr\u00e1ficos\u00a0de M\u00e9xico and previously worked closely with Claudia Sheinbaum during her time as mayor of\u00a0Tlalpan. Valle, for his part, was involved in drafting the most recent electoral reform promoted by the president. Also advancing to the next stage is Flavio Cienfuegos, with 86 points, who served as chief of staff to Guadalupe Taddei; along with Mar\u00eda Fernanda Romo, also\u00a0with a score of\u00a086, currently director for the removal procedures of local electoral councillors and for political violence against women cases at the INE. The most\u00a0visible group\u00a0also includes\u00a0Alejandra Tello, who works as a researcher at the Electoral Judicial School of the Federal Electoral Tribunal, and Patricia Avenda\u00f1o, president of Mexico City\u2019s electoral institute. Politically, the point\u00a0here\u00a0is not trivial: several of the\u00a0highest-scoring\u00a0candidates\u00a0entering the final stretch of the process\u00a0are\u00a0linked, directly or indirectly, to\u00a0Morena\u00a0or to the current electoral apparatus.<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> Chatter box<\/b><\/p> \u00a0<\/p> Contacto:<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> Laura Camacho<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> Directora Ejecutiva de Asuntos P\u00fablicos de Miranda\u00a0<\/p>