Midnight Math: Will Last-Minute Deals Deliver the Votes by Dawn?<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>
Mexico\u2019s 2026 electoral reform has shifted from presidential unveiling to coalition stress test in under a week. Although President Sheinbaum said in Monday\u2019s morning press conference that the full constitutional text would be made public, the rollout stalled. Media had already reported Morena\u2019s floor leaders from both chambers gathering at the congressional complex, fuelling expectations of an imminent release. Instead, Ricardo Monreal\u00a0emerged\u00a0to say there would be no text that night, that the initiative would move to committees once formally\u00a0submitted, and that lawmakers should expect at least two weeks of debate. He also acknowledged the arithmetic: without the PVEM and PT, a two-thirds constitutional majority is unreachable in practice.\u00a0<\/p>
What, precisely, is in dispute is not a marginal tidy-up but the mechanics by which smaller parties stay\u00a0powerful and\u00a0potentially act as a (modest) check on Morena\u2019s dominance of Mexico\u2019s Congress. The proposal, as outlined publicly, has three pillars\u00a0(for\u00a0additional\u00a0information,\u00a0please see\u00a0Ernesto N\u00fa\u00f1ez\u2019s analysis\u00a0in\u00a0El Pa\u00eds<\/a>).\u00a0<\/p> First, it targets the cost of politics: cutting public financing for parties and reducing the electoral authority\u2019s budget by 25 per cent. On paper, this is sold as austerity. In practice, critics argue it risks weakening the INE\u2019s permanent professional apparatus \u2014 the voter registry, compliance oversight, and the territorial network of 333 offices that deliver polling stations and election-night administration.\u00a0<\/p> Second, it reworks representation,\u00a0the most combustible element for coalition partners.\u00a0On plurinominal seats, the sensitive point is not abolishing proportional representation altogether, the Chamber of Deputies would remain at 500 members, but changing the method by which the 200 proportional seats are\u00a0allocated. The proposal\u00a0eliminates\u00a0closed party lists and replaces them with mechanisms more directly tied to individual vote performance. Under what has been publicly outlined, and could still change,\u00a0roughly 97\u00a0seats would go to \u201cbest losers\u201d \u2014 candidates who did not win their single-member district but achieved the highest vote share among non-winning candidates within their party. Another 95 seats would be filled through direct voting within multi-state constituencies (circunscripciones<\/i>),\u00a0reportedly with\u00a0gender parity rules (one man and one woman). An\u00a0additional\u00a0eight\u00a0seats would be reserved for Mexicans abroad.\u00a0<\/p> In practical terms, this shifts proportional representation away from party-controlled national lists and toward territorially anchored, candidate-based performance. That distinction matters. For smaller coalition partners such as the PT and PVEM, the existing list system has been a reliable route to representation. It allows parties with modest but stable national vote shares to convert that support into a defined bloc of seats, even if they struggle to win first-past-the-post districts. A system based on \u201cbest losers\u201d and direct\u00a0constituency\u00a0voting would tend to reward parties that are competitive at the district level \u2014 typically Morena and, in some regions, the opposition \u2014 rather than those that rely on list placement to secure influence.\u00a0<\/p> In the Senate, the reported redesign is more abrupt still: a\u00a0reduction from\u00a0128 to 96 seats,\u00a0eliminating\u00a0the national proportional list and leaving representation more tightly tied to state-level results. For smaller parties, that would further narrow the structural pathways through which they secure guaranteed representation.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p> Third, it adds a new regulatory layer around campaign technology, with language on artificial intelligence and disinformation. The concern raised by critics is that vague provisions could expand electoral oversight into content policing, turning the referee into an arbiter of \u201ctruth\u201d in a polarised environment.\u00a0<\/p> Those design choices explain the coalition tension. The\u00a0PVEM or\u00a0Green Party, via Manuel Velasco, has said it is \u201c90 to 95 per cent aligned\u201d, suggesting it believes the draft can be softened. The PT has been\u00a0more blunt,\u00a0warning that the reform risks building a \u201cparty of the state\u201d and objecting to changes it argues would weaken proportional representation and the federal balance. Opposition parties\u00a0remain\u00a0uniformly opposed.\u00a0<\/p> As we can go into the final innings of the debate on the electoral reform, several points are\u00a0fairly\u00a0clear.\u00a0The\u00a0PAN-PRI-MC\u00a0opposition\u00a0parties (supported by much of the private sector)\u00a0argues the reform will cement one-party Morena rule and undermine investment and faith in Mexico\u2019s institutions.\u00a0The PT-PVEM (Verde)\u00a0parties, currently part of the Morena block, see the reform as threatening their representation in Congress and access to money.\u00a0\u00a0Thus,\u00a0the\u00a0PVEM\u00a0is\u00a0proposing to keep the 25 per cent reduction while flattening the distribution formula so every party gets the same amount, a\u00a0non-starter\u00a0for Morena.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p> Meanwhile Sheinbaum has framed this as a clash with party elites,\u00a0warning\u00a0that \u201cwhoever wants to keep the privilege of lists\u201d will have to answer\u00a0to voters, effectively daring PVEM and PT\u00a0(and PAN, PRI, MC)\u00a0to defend plurinominal patronage.\u00a0Controlled national lists have\u00a0historically\u00a0served as safe seats for party bosses and ex\u2011candidates\u00a0of smaller parties that do\u00a0not dominate at the\u00a0national levels\u00a0(think Marko Cort\u00e9s, Ricardo Anaya, Alejandro Moreno, Alberto Anaya, Manuel Velasco, etc),\u00a0underlining why leaderships\u00a0of minority parties\u00a0resist losing that lever.\u00a0And in arithmetic terms, Morena\u2019s 253 deputies and 67 senators leave it 81 and 19 votes short of a supermajority, which only PVEM and PT can supply,\u00a0making their rejection of the 97\/95\/8 design\u00a0in particular\u00a0a big\u00a0stumbling block.\u00a0<\/p> Over the weekend, several analysts questioned the logic of advancing a reform that appears short of votes. Yet there is a political logic to a bill\u00a0even if that bill\u00a0fails: Sheinbaum can claim she delivered on a promise to cut costs and privileges, while shifting the blame for obstruction onto allied parties defending the very mechanisms that keep them in Congress. The early-morning pause may\u00a0anyway\u00a0simply reflect bargaining over two red lines: the seat-allocation rules (especially\u00a0plurinominals) and the savings package (party financing and the INE budget).\u00a0<\/p> Meanwhile, the INE had already sent ten technical proposals in January \u2014 including hybrid electronic voting, institutional\u00a0strengthening\u00a0and procedural safeguards \u2014 that critics say are only partially reflected in what has been previewed. As the full text becomes public, the immediate question is less ideological than numerical: whether any last-minute tweak protects PVEM and PT\u2019s future seat counts enough to secure the votes \u2014 or whether this was always a reform designed to be proposed, argued over, and ultimately parked.\u00a0<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> Following the Money: Bilateral Security Goes Ledger-First<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> On\u00a0Feb. 19,\u00a0in a reminder that modern security cooperation increasingly runs on spreadsheets rather than sirens, Mexico\u2019s Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) and the US Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation division (IRS-CI) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to formalise the exchange of financial intelligence linked to transnational criminal flows \u2014 with pointed emphasis on illicit arms trafficking. Non-binding in legal form yet operationally consequential, the instrument institutionalises structured sharing of suspicious transaction analysis, investigative\u00a0methodologies\u00a0and financial traceability data across borders. Notably, it expands enforcement reach without a single legislative amendment, relying instead on administrative alignment and inter-agency plumbing.\u00a0<\/p> The regulatory impact is subtle but cumulative. By framing arms trafficking through the lens of financial intelligence, the bilateral agenda shifts from rhetorical attribution to transactional mapping: beneficial ownership layers, correspondent banking corridors and complex cross-border transfers become shared analytical territory. For private actors, no new black-letter compliance obligations appear. In practice, however, synchronised scrutiny raises detection probability and compresses response timelines.\u00a0The memorandum dovetails with Mexico\u2019s post-2025 centralisation of intelligence architecture, extending that model outward.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> When an Expired Patent\u00a0Isn\u2019t\u00a0Quite Expired<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> In simple terms: a medicine with an expired\u00a0patent\u00a0has been granted a second life by the courts. Amgen\u2019s patent of\u00a0Denosumab \u2014 used to treat osteoporosis and certain bone cancers \u2014 formally expired three years ago. After that, Mexico\u2019s regulator (COFEPRIS) authorised three biosimilar versions, typically lower-cost alternatives from\u00a0Alvotech, Celltrion and Samsung\u00a0Bioepis. Amgen challenged the way the patent authority (IMPI) had handled aspects of the original process, alleging procedural defects. In February, a federal collegiate court upheld an earlier ruling in its favour. The practical effect is that the expired patent has been \u201crevived\u201d,\u00a0temporarily blocking competing biosimilars and preserving Amgen\u2019s exclusivity in a market where public purchases are estimated at\u00a0roughly MXN\u00a01.9 billion for 2025\u20132026.\u00a0<\/p> The legal controversy now extends well beyond one molecule. IMPI\u2019s director, Santiago Nieto, has publicly described the ruling as an overreach that weakens the integrity of Mexico\u2019s patent framework and creates tension with international IP standards. Biosimilar manufacturers warn of legal uncertainty: if patent expiry can be revisited through\u00a0amparo<\/i>\u00a0on procedural grounds, investment planning becomes litigation-dependent rather than rule-based. From a fiscal and health policy perspective, delayed competition sustains higher prices and pressures public procurement budgets. Yet from the innovator\u2019s side, judicial review is framed as a legitimate corrective when administrative errors affect high-value biomedicine. The structural risk is precedent. If courts continue to reopen closed patent terms, the Federal Law for the Protection of Industrial Property may shift from a system defined by fixed timelines to one shaped by post-expiry litigation \u2014 a subtle but consequential change for competition, public\u00a0spending\u00a0and R&D incentives alike.\u00a0<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> Growth, but Keep the Champagne on Ice<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> A tenth of a percentage point rarely makes headlines \u2014 unless the broader mood is fragile. The OECD\u2019s 2026 Economic Survey for Mexico, presented on\u00a0Feb. 25-26\u00a0in Mexico City, nudged growth expectations up to 1.4% for 2026 (from 1.2% in December) and 1.7% for 2027, with inflation projected at 3.6% this year and 3.2% next \u2014 broadly in line with\u00a0Banxico\u2019s\u00a0target band. The tone was cautiously upbeat: resilience in the face of renewed US trade tensions, stability amid tariff volatility. The underlying message, however, is more\u00a0measured than triumphant. Mexico is holding steady \u2014 not surging, not stalling. In the current global context, that counts as progress.\u00a0<\/p> Sharing the stage with OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann, Finance Undersecretary Edgar Amador leaned into fiscal consolidation, spending efficiency and strategic investment in digitalisation,\u00a0education\u00a0and infrastructure. Nearshoring was framed less as a windfall and more as a productivity strategy. For business, the implications are pragmatic.\u00a0Contained\u00a0inflation eases financing pressures and supports medium-term capital expenditure, particularly in manufacturing and\u00a0logistics\u00a0tied to North American supply chains. Yet fiscal discipline limits room for stimulus, leaving smaller firms exposed to softer demand and external shocks. The OECD\u2019s policy prescription \u2014 human capital, digital adoption, smarter public spending \u2014 reads less like short-term rescue and more like structural homework.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> Telefonica\u00a0Tax\u00a0Victory\u00a0Provides\u00a0Some\u00a0Hope for\u00a0Private\u00a0Sector<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> Mexico\u2019s Supreme Court has handed the private sector a clear win in a high\u2011stakes tax case, in a way that underlines how procedural limits on the state can still bite even in politically sensitive disputes. In late February,\u00a0the Suprema Corte de Justicia de la\u00a0Naci\u00f3n\u00a0(SCJN) ruled that the\u00a0Secretar\u00eda\u00a0de Hacienda y Cr\u00e9dito P\u00fablico (SHCP) \u2014 and by extension the SAT \u2014 did not have legal standing to challenge an\u00a0amparo<\/i>\u00a0that a lower court granted to Telef\u00f3nica\u2019s Mexican unit (Pegaso\u00a0PCS, S.A. de C.V.), meaning the company will not have to pay a 4,442 million peso (\u2248 $220\u2011280 m) income tax credit dating back to fiscal\u00a0year\u00a02015.\u00a0<\/p> The dispute arose after the tax authority rejected certain deductions tied to a 2014 corporate merger and\u00a0subsequently\u00a0assessed a large tax credit. The case worked its way through administrative and federal courts, and the SCJN majority focused on procedure rather than substance: it concluded that the Finance Ministry lacked the procedural legitimacy to overturn the protective judgment previously granted to Telef\u00f3nica, and therefore dismissed its challenge without reopening the merits of the underlying tax assessment. The result is that the\u00a0amparo<\/i>\u00a0in Telef\u00f3nica\u2019s favour now stands, and the company is relieved of the contested tax liability.\u00a0<\/p> For Mexico\u2019s private sector, the decision offers a measure of reassurance about the enforceability of constitutional remedies in tax matters. While\u00a0the\u00a0judicial reform has\u00a0understandably\u00a0raised concerns about alignment with executive\u2011branch priorities, this specific ruling shows that carefully structured\u00a0amparos<\/i>\u00a0can still succeed against the state\u2019s tax arm when authorities overstep procedural bounds. It signals that, at\u00a0least in\u00a0this case, the Court was prepared to enforce formal limits on who may challenge a taxpayer\u2019s victory, rather than deferring automatically to the fiscal authorities\u2019 position.\u00a0<\/p> The\u00a0outcome is likely to be read in the corporate community as encouragement for other companies facing large SAT assessments to pursue constitutional remedies where they see procedural defects, in the expectation that higher courts may uphold those challenges.\u00a0In an environment where many businesses feared that judicial change would narrow the space for impartial review, this prominent tax victory for Telef\u00f3nica is being interpreted as an example of the judiciary acting as an effective check on state power in a commercial dispute,\u00a0not a sweeping transformation of the system, but a concrete reminder that legal constraints on the government\u00a0can\u00a0still matter in practice.<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> To\u00a0Refund or\u00a0Not to\u00a0Refund;\u00a0That\u00a0Is the\u00a0Question<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> Importers into the US of\u00a0non-USMCA\u00a0compliant Mexican goods now face an awkward, but potentially profitable question: should the companies that import\u00a0goods into the United States now try to get their money back on tariffs the US Supreme Court has just struck down? In practice, those \u201cimporters of Mexican exports\u201d are often the same firms that manufacture in Mexico or are closely tied to Mexican producers, so the issue quickly becomes a board\u2011level question on both sides of the border rather than an abstract state\u2011to\u2011state dispute.\u00a0<\/p> The Court\u2019s ruling invalidated the 2025 tariff architecture built under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) \u2014 including the baseline \u201creciprocal\u201d surcharge and the 25% border\u2011security duties applied to Mexico. In practice, the pain\u00a0fell\u00a0almost\u00a0totally\u00a0on\u00a0non\u2011USMCA\u2011compliant exports, because USMCA\u2011qualifying goods were\u00a0mostly\u00a0carved out or later exempted,\u00a0(though some supply chains still got caught\u00a0in the 25% tariff). If a tariff is collected under an authority the Court says the President did not have, those duties become an obvious target for refund strategies by US importers of Mexican products, provided they move within procedural deadlines and file the right claims.\u00a0<\/p> The decision does not touch tariffs under Section 232 \u2014 steel, aluminium and autos\u00a0and car parts\u00a0remain\u00a0outside the refund conversation and continue to be governed by their own legal regime.\u00a0<\/p> The ruling also makes USMCA more valuable as both shield and\u00a0a US\u00a0bargaining chip. The White House quickly shifted to Section 122 of the Trade Act, imposing a new \u201ctemporary\u201d 10% global surcharge (going to 15%), while keeping USMCA\u2011compliant goods\u00a0exempt. That exemption is now Mexico\u2019s main protective buffer \u2014 and\u00a0yet\u00a0gives the US yet\u00a0more\u00a0leverage \u2014 ahead of the next round of talks.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p> In the meantime, Mexico\u2019s non-USMCA compliant goods are just paying 10%\u00a0(or\u00a0eventually\u00a015% tariff)\u00a0under Section 122, not 25%\u00a0under IEEPA. That\u00a0is a big deal\u00a0for affected\u00a0Mexican\u00a0exports not compliant with USMCA, as they were at a disadvantage versus many other countries (UK,\u00a0EU, Japan etc) which were paying 10% or 15% tariffs\u00a0after reaching\u00a0IEEPA\u00a0trade deals with the US.\u00a0Moving everyone bar USMCA\u00a0compliant exports to Section 122 means the playing field has been levelled for\u00a0non-USMCA\u00a0compliant Mexico exporters, while USMCA exporters keep\u00a0their\u00a0edge.\u00a0Mexico\u2019s effective tariff rate to the US has thus gone down to 3.8% (for now).\u00a0<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> Chatter box<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> \u00a0<\/p> Contacto:<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> Laura Camacho<\/b>\u00a0<\/p> Directora Ejecutiva de Asuntos P\u00fablicos de Miranda\u00a0<\/p>